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which was created to consider claims against the United States. Such a
function is a legislative function, and the court in the principal case was
correct in holding the Court of Claims a legislative court.
In view of the principal case, it seems difficult to justify the result in
the case of O'Donoghue v. United States 20 which was decided at the
same term. In the latter case, it was held that the Courts of the District
of Columbia were judicial courts under Art. 3 and that therefore the
salaries of the judges could not be reduced. Yet, judgments of the courts
of the District of Columbia are held to be advisory, and it is held that such
courts may carry on legislative functions, and that they are therefore legis-
lative courts,21 and that consequently the Supreme Court has no appellate
jurisdiction. 21 The cases cited settled the proposition that functions essen-
tially administrative or legislative cannot be imposed upon judicial courts. 22
The O'Donoghue case seems to overrule the above authority and hold that
judicial courts can render advisory opinions and perform functions essen-
tially legislative. Yet the principal case concerning the Court of Claims
was decided at the same session and is in line with the authority that a
judicial court cannot have thrust upon it legislative and administrative
functions, but that such result can only be obtained in the case of legisla-
tive courts. The Supreme Court, it seems, has decided the same question
in both cases differently. It is difficult to rationalize the result.
Although Evens v. Gore23 is rationalized on the grounds that a reduction
of a federal judge's salary is unconstitutional, it may be questioned as to
the correctness of holding that an income tax on a judge's salary is a
reduction as contemplated by Art. 3. Evens v. Gore holds that an income
tax results in an unconstitutional reduction of a judge's salary, but goes
on to say that the property of a Federal judge may be taxed. A tax on
one is just as much a diminishment of the salary as a tax on the other.
Holmes in his dissent in Evens v. Gore says that it is not the purpose of
Art. 3 to make judges a privileged class exempt from supporting institu-
tions which benefit them. It is difficult to see how a statute requiring a
man to pay taxes that all other men have to pay can be made an instru-
ment to attack his independence. What the Constitution really intended
to protect against, it seems, was a direct reduction of a judge's salary, and
not to exempt the judges from the ordinary duties of citizens by exempting
them from payment of income taxes. M. K.
NUISANCE-UNDERTAKING ESTABULSHMENTS-Plaintiffs brought an ac-
tion to enjoin the defendants from using certain premises located in a
residential district for a funeral home and undertaking establishment. The
20 O'Donoghue v. United States (1933), 53 S. Ct. 740.
= Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co. (1912), 281 U. S. 464, 74
L. ed. 969; Keller v. Potomac Electric Co. (1922), 261 U. S. 428, 67 IL. ed. 731;
Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Company (1926), 272 U. S. 693, 71 L. ed.
478; Ex Parte Bakelite Corporation (1928), 279 U. S. 438, 73 L. ed. 789.
22 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. (1855), 18 How. 272,
15 L. ed. 372; United States v. Ferreira (1851), 13 How. 40, 14 L. ed. 42; Gordon v.
United States (1864), 117 U. S. 697 (appendix) ; In re Sanborne (1892), 148 U. S.
222, 37 L. ed. 429; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. McGinnis (1926), 273 U. S. 70, 71
L. ed. 541.
2Evens v. Gore (1919), 253 U. -S. 245, 64 L. ed. 887.
RECENT CASE NOTES
first paragraph of the complaint alleged violation of a zoning ordinance;
the second proceeded on the theory of a private nuisance. Special findings
of fact disclosed that the proposed funeral home would be located in a
purely residential section of city, used eyclusively for residential purposes,
and built up with substantial and valuable homes; that the constant pres-
ence of dead persons on premises and presence of funeral cars would create
such constant reminder of death as to depress the plaintiffs, and that
the peculiar nature of the business would be a constant annoyance and
inconvenience, thereby disturbing the plaintiffs in the comfort and quiet
enjoyment of their homes. Upon judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on
these facts, the defendants moved for a new trial, which motion was de-
nied. After the appeal was perfected, the defendants filed a verified mo-
tion to dismiss parts of the appeal, since the city planning commission had
amended the zoning ordinance relied on by the plaintiffs in the first
paragraph of the complaint. This being uncontroverted, the question pre-
sented by the first paragraph was considered moot, and appeal was
determined by the issues presented by the second paragraph. Held, opera-
tion of a funeral home and undertaking business in a purely residential
district constitutes a private nuisance which may be enjoined.1
As a general rule, in determining what constitutes a nuisance, the ques-
tion is whether the act complained of will produce such a condition as in
the judgment of reasonable men is naturally productive of physical dis-
comfort to persons of ordinary sensibilities and habits, and under the
circumstances unreasonable, and in derogation of the rights of the com-
plaining party.2 However, every person holds his property subject to the
right of his neighbor to devote his property to any lawful business.3
But even a lawful business may be so conducted as to cause a nuisance;
and in order to warrant interference by injunction the injury must be
material and essential, though the plaintiff is not bound to prove both an
injury to the property itself and an interference with its enjoyment. In-
terference with comfortable enjoyment alone is enough for an injunction,4
and evidence of the depreciation of the value of the property may be con-
sidered as regards the fact of nuisance.5 A lawful business will not be
enjoined merely because it diminishes the value of adjacent property.6
Authorization by zoning ordinance, however, is no defense to an action
for nuisance.7
As regards the specific business involved in the case under consideration
the Indiana court had no precedent from past Indiana decisions. It is
universally held that an undertaking establishment is not a nuisance per
se,
8 though by reason of surrounding circumstances, it may become a
'Albright v. Crim (1933), 185 N. E. 304.
- eeks v. Wood (1917), 66 Ind. App. 594, 118 N. E. 591; Baltimore etc., R.
Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church (1883), 108 U. S. 317, 27 L. ed. 739; McIntosh v. Brim-
mer (1924), 68 Cal. App. 770, 230 Pac. 203. See Harper on Torts, 3182.
3 Siskoyou Lumber and Mercantile Co. v. nostel (1898), 121 Cal. 511, 53 Pac.
1118; Gallagher v. Flury (1904). 99 Md. 181, 57 At. 672.
'Owen v. Phillips (1881), 73 Ind. 284; Harper on Torts% § 186.
5Conway v. Gampel (1926), 235 Mich. 511, 209 N. W. 562.
0 Owen v. Phillips (1881), 73 Ind. 284.
7 Ewbank v. Yellow Cab Co. (1925), 84 Ind. App. 144, 149 N. E. 647.
6 Higgins v. Block (1924), 216 Ala. 153, 192 So. 739; Meldahl v. Holberg (1927).
55 N. D. 523, 214 N. W. 802.
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nuisance.9 Where such an establishment is located in an exclusively
residential district, some courts have held that even when so located with
the result that because of sentimental repugnance on the part of those
who might reside near it, property values in the vicinity would depreciate,
the establishment would not be enjoined.1O The courts advancing this theory
are those of Oregon, Kentucky and New Jersey.
In California it was held that maintainence of an undertaking parlor in
a residential district where it was not shown that foul and obnoxious
odors, or danger of infectious diseases was present, but only a disturbance
of quiet enjoyment and resultant mental and physical depression would
not be enjoined under the California Civil Code."1
The above cases, however, appear to be in the minority, and by what
appears to be the great weight of modern authority, and in accord with
the decision in the principal case, it is held that the location of such a
business in a residential district is sufficiently objectionable to make it a
nuisance. 12 The theory upon which these courts base their decisions is
that the inherent nature of an undertaking establishment is such that, if
located in a residential district, it will inevitably create an atmosphere
detrimental to the use and enjoyment of residential property, produce
material annoyance and inconvenience to the occupants of adjacent dwell-
ings and render them physically uncomfortable. Therefore, in the absence
of a strong showing of public necessity, its location in such a district
should not be permitted over the protest of those who would be materially
injured thereby.1S
It is a clear deduction from the opinions cited that there is a growing
tendency of the courts, through the superior relief afforded by equity, to
protect the average aesthetic and cultural side of human life as centered
in the home, even where such a tendency comes in conflict with the forward
march of business enterprise. As the Wisconsin court said in State ex rel.
Carter v. Harper, 14 "The rights of property should not be sacrificed to the
pleasure of an ultra-aesthetic taste. But whether they should be permitted
to plague the average or dominant human sensibilities well may be
pondered." R. S. 0.
RIGHT OF A BANK TO PL~mGE ITS ASSETS AS SECU~niY FOR A Punic DE-
Posrr-The directors of a bank organized under the laws of Indiana as-
9 Higgins v. Block (1924), 216 Ala. 153, 192 So. 739; Bragg v. Ives (1927), 149
V. 482, 140 S. E. 656.
loStoddard v. Snodgrass (1925), 117 Or. 262, 241 Pac. 73, 43 A. L. R. 1160;
i. D. Pearson and Son v. Bonnie (1925), 209 Ky. 307, 272 S. W. 375; Westcott v.
Middleton (1887), 43 N. J. Eq. 478, 11 Atl. 490.
11 Dean v. Powell Undertaking Co. (1922), 55 Cal. App. 545, 203 Pac. 1015.
1Cunningham v. Miller (1922), 178 Wis. 22, 189 N. W. 531; Sair v. Joy (1917),
198 Mich. 295, 164 N. W. 507; Dillon v. Moran (1926), 237 Mich. 130, 211 N. W. 67;
Beisel v. Crosby (1920). 104 Neb. 643, 178 N. W. 272; Meagher v. Kessler (1920),
147 Minn. 182, 179 N. W. 732; Osborn v. City of Ohreveport (1918), 143 La. 932,
79 So. 542; Jordan v. Nesmith (1928), 132 Okl. 226, 269 Pac. 1096; Meldahl v.
Holberg (1927), 55 N. W. 523, 214 N. W. 802; Turrelin v. Ketterlin (1924), 304
Mo. 221, 263 S. W. 202; Leland v. Turner (1924), 117 Kan 294, 230 Pac. 1061; City
of St. Paul v. Kessler (1920), 178 N. W. 171, 146 Minn. 124; Arthur v. Virkler
(1932), 258 N. Y. S. 886, 144 Misc. 483.
IsCooley, Torts (1932, 4th ed.), vol. 3, sec. 435.
14 (1923), 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451.
